Reflection for December 2 - Sartre

            Central to the discussion this week was Jean-Paul Sartre’s conceptualization of “bad faith.” When Sartre begins discussing the critical elements that comprise this bad faith, he notes that “it is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of the idea” (Sartre in Solomon, 226). In other words, our discussion of what constitutes bad faith immediately becomes complicated with the formation of a contradictory subject. To provide an example of what this contradictory nature is and how it looks in action, Sartre provides the reader with a scenario in which he portrays a woman and a man on a date of some sort. Furthermore, he explains this woman is in bad faith.

            This woman’s bad faith is derived out of this contradictory idea explained earlier. That is, Sartre wants to reassure us that she is most certainly aware of something, however even with this consciousness she simply negates the truth. Put simply, Sartre is trying to imply something about human nature. He wants to show that deep down this woman is fully aware of the fact that she inspires a particular (sexual) desire in the man, however to acknowledge this would apparently humiliate and horrify her. Therefore, she portrays herself in a certain way to try to and sidestep her obligation to make that crucial decision of allowing any kind of intimacy to form between the two. She tries to present herself as an intellectual, something above the kind of human nature that Sartre is trying to convince the reader of.

            Thus, it appears that the conceptualization of bad faith is heavily reliant on the idea that there must be two elements present to be in bad faith. That is, there must be a truth, and at the same time, a lie. What’s more, these two seemingly incompatible elements must both be present within the same agent to achieve the contradictory nature that this discussion has revolved around so far. The woman in the example provided by Sartre can be explained to be in bad faith simply due to the fact that she is, at a certain subconscious level, fully aware of the true intentions of the man that she is on a date with. However, she convinces herself otherwise because to acknowledge the truth would force her to realize just how disgusting human nature is. To deceive herself is to allow herself to remain veiled by the mask that she has formulated for herself throughout life. Similarly, to recognize the truth would be detrimental to her entire identity.

            From here, we have a better understanding of bad faith. Bad faith is also essential to the concepts of facticity and transcendence. A particular example that I found to be quite compelling is that of a student who obtains bad grades, yet believes that the achievement of medical school is still within reach. However, there are certain facts which comprise the facticity of the matter which restrict this individual from obtaining her goals and aspirations. It could certainly be explained that this person is in bad faith; however I would not be so quick to extend such a judgment on the matter. This is because of the problem previously explained within the contradictory nature of bad faith. If the individual in this particular scenario authentically believes that she still has a possibility of obtaining her goals of attending medical school, I would not argue that she is in bad faith because she is not deceiving herself of anything, but rather that she is simply mistaken.

            I come to this conclusion by applying an example from my own life. For me to explain how this is so, I feel that I must also address whether or not I am in bad faith when I am working my job in a grocery store as a cashier. For each and every transaction I begin by asking the customer how they are and whether or not they have found everything that they are looking for. In a way, you could easily argue that I am being challenged with conflicting roles: the role of a cashier, and the role of who I really am. With this in mind, however, I would most certainly not claim that I am in bad faith. This is because of the fact that I am fully aware of the fact that I am being paid to perform a certain service, and that if I want to be paid I will also have to do as I am required. I understand that I am not being forced act the way I am, but that I am willing to in order to receive compensation. Put more simply, the instance that I have explained above does not contain deception at any point. Therefore, a critical aspect of bad faith is missing and so I would argue that I would not be acting in such a way. 

Reflection for November 25 - Sartre

Under examination for this week was Jean-Paul Sartre, a notable philosopher of the twentieth century. Of the particular themes that Sartre has worked upon, the discussion here emphasizes the roles of freedom and responsibility as well as his work to understand and explain the role of emotions and how they interact with the former. To begin at a logical starting point, I want to first put forth the notion within Sartre’s work that you as an individual are ultimately responsible for the decisions that you make, regardless of extenuating circumstances. This notion feeds off of the explanation that everyone should act how they feel that society as a whole should act. In other words, Sartre wants to persuade that one should make actions in accordance to how they feel everyone should. This stems from the idea that one should question what would happen if every member of society acted in a similar fashion. Furthermore, this subsequently accentuates the idea that you do not just make decisions for yourself, but that you make decisions for all of mankind.

            From here, it would also be a logical counter for an individual to point that their actions should not be accepted or interpreted as that of a model. That is, when questioning what would happen if everyone acted in a similar fashion to you, it surely seems plausible to point to the more likely fact that not everyone does so. However, according to Sartre, “but in truth, one ought always to ask oneself what would happen if everyone did as one is doing; nor can one escape from that disturbing thought except by a kind of self-deception. The man who lies in self-excuse, by saying ‘Everyone will not do it,’ must be ill at ease in his conscience, for the act of lying implies the universal value which it denies. By its very disguise his anguish reveals itself” (Sartre in Solomon, 209). From this, Sartre is trying to emphasize that responsibility for one’s actions in this instance is attempted to be shifted away, due to a crushing realization of one’s responsibility once accepting that your actions go beyond simply yourself.

            Responsibility to Sartre is a very important thing. The notion of good faith hinges on the idea that one needs to take responsibility for their actions, and there are ultimately no excuses for not being able to claim responsibility for your actions.  To be sure, it becomes more understandable why Sartre might want to write in emphasis of responsibility when you consider the time period in which he is writing – that is, the horrible events around World War II. When referencing responsibility in this period, he writes “when, for instance, a military leader takes upon himself the responsibility for an attack and sends a number of men to their death, he chooses to do it and at bottom he alone chooses. No doubt he acts under a higher command, but its orders, which are more general, require interpretation by him and upon that interpretation depends the life of ten, fourteen or twenty men” (Sartre in Solomon, 210).

            So at the bottom of this, I feel that Sartre wants to point out that the majority of the deaths that can be accounted for during this horrible time period should not fall on the responsibility of just a few individuals at the top of the hierarchical command structure. Rather, every individual agent that decided to take action and participate within the war structure was responsible for their own actions. This is simply to say that responsibility cannot be exempted because of coercion. As much as I may want to say that I am unhappy due to the circumstances that I am placed in, which has left me no choice, I cannot. More specifically, I may want to say that I am unhappy because society has dictated that I must go to college, get an education, start a family, and work a 9-5. I may want to say that I had no choice but to comply with these societal norms. Yet, I would be wrong. Sartre shows that in this instance, my unhappiness cannot be blamed on these circumstances. To blame these circumstances is to attempt to alleviate myself of the anguish in the realization that my own sadness is my own responsibility.

            From here I want to transition to Sartre’s works concerning emotions. Even here, however, the idea of responsibility is echoed in Sartre’s writings. To illustrate how emotions are interrelated to the way in which you perceive the world, he uses a story of grapes. This story tells of an agent who reaches to pick some grapes, however after doing so, finds that they are out of reach. To cope with the responding event, the agent simply shrugs it off justifying that they were too green anyways. When writing of this Sartre shows that “at first, they presented themselves as ‘having to be picked.’ But this urgent quality very soon becomes unbearable because the potentiality cannot be realized. This unbearable tension becomes, in turn, a motive for foisting upon the grapes the new quality ‘too green,’ which will resolve the conflict and eliminate the tension… I magically confer upon the grapes the quality I desire” (Sartre in Calhoun and Solomon, 4).

            Furthermore, responsibility and obligations are important themes in instances with identifiable emotions. To show this, he writes “for example, if I have learned I am ruined, I no longer have the same means at my disposal (private auto, etc.) to carry them out. I have to substitute new media for them (to take the bus, etc.); that is precisely what I do not want. Sadness aims at eliminating the obligation to seek new ways, to transform the structure of the world by a totally undifferentiated structure” (Sartre in Calhoun and Solomon, 4). In the first instance, Sartre wants to show us that we are thoroughly convinced that the substance of the grapes has changed. However, we “magically” confer this quality upon them. In reality, nothing about the grapes has changed; our convincing ourselves of such an occurrence is simply to relieve ourselves of our obligation to pick the grapes in the circumstance of us not being able to. 

Reflection for November 18 - Heidegger

      Continuing from last week’s discussion of Heidegger, this discussion will primarily function from Heidegger’s position concerning how Da-sein relates to the concept of death. We have already covered this conceptualization of Da-sein and how it closely resembles the idea that an individual is aware, and open to the world in a sort of liquid-like state. That is, Da-sein is something that we strive for in our everyday lives. Interestingly enough, Heidegger and Nietzsche are similar in this sense. Whereas the elements of Da-sein are something to strive for, the ubermensch described by Nietzsche is similarly relevant. Heidegger claims that philosophy is for the few, that is, it is an extremely complicated way of approaching ideas which has the tendency to break down societal norms. I may return to this more later, however, for now I simply want to make the point that Da-sein is an extremely complicated concept in which death, consequently, plays a large role.
  Generally speaking, death is the totality of being. That is, it is the completion of the experience of Da-sein. Heidegger writes that “the transition to no-longer-being-there lifts Da-sein right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. This kind of thing is denied to actual Da-sein in relation to itself” (Heidegger in Solomon, 139). This is an extremely interesting point in the sense that Heidegger wants to show that although death is your own, you cannot and do not experience your own death. Rather, people interact with the concept of death through the loss of a life that is around them. According to Heidegger, “death does not reveal itself as a loss, but as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the loss of being as such which the dying person ‘suffers’ does not become accessible. We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just ‘there’ too” (Heidegger in Solomon, 140).
  This, however, creates the issue how we should feel about our lives in the face of death. Class discussion was quite heated around this topic as one classmate pointed to the fact that we can ultimately never grasp death until we are essentially faced with it. I believe that I would agree with this idea in the sense that I do not feel as if I can truly understand how I would consider my life in its totality in the face of death. In other words, while I may have a certain idea of how I would feel about my life in such a circumstance (more than likely overwhelmed with anxiety that everything that I have done or learned in my life was not put to a more practical use), I cannot be certain that this is actually how I would feel when genuinely facing the ultimate end of my being.
Rather than having a complete conceptualization of death, I believe that the authenticity which relates to death in Heidegger’s writing is more concerned with being aware of the “indefinite certainty of death.” This certainty and how it relates to Da-sein is explained that by “anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself to a constant threat arising from its own there. Being-towards-the-end must hold itself in this very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty” (Heidegger in Solomon, 144). Therefore, I would argue that authenticity relating to death in the way that Heidegger explains it does not necessarily require the individual to have an ultimate grasp of how we would consider our lives in the face of death, nor does it require us to have a grasp of the experience of our own death. Rather, we should have an understanding of our indefinite certainty of death, which is the totality of our Da-sein and how this produces authenticity.
From here, I wanted to briefly discuss the idea that philosophy is useless in a certain degree. Heidegger grants this idea, but goes on to point out that what is useless can still be a force. When speaking of this, he asserts that “philosophy can never directly supply the energies and create the opportunities and methods that bring about historical change… It spreads only indirectly, by devious paths that can never be laid out in advance, until at last, at some future date, it sinks to the level of a commonplace” (Heidegger in Solomon, 148-149). However, when speaking of this, I do not believe that Heidegger desires to establish philosophy as a completely unnecessary practice.
      Science and mathematics are practices which are objective and can “do” things. In other words, Heidegger wants to point out that you cannot necessarily do anything with philosophy as you can with objective sciences, but this is not important. What is important is what philosophy can do with the individual. Philosophers can indirectly promote society by inquiring into the “extra-ordinary.” As I discussed at the beginning of this essay, philosophers in this sense are similar to the madman depicted in the parable by Nietzsche. Heidegger makes many references to timing when speaking of philosophy, and in this sense, it is similar because philosophers will always be too early. So, even though philosophy has a tendency to make things more difficult and can be considered useless on a rudimentary level, we can still conclude that it is worth doing.

Reflection for November 4 - Unamuno and Heidegger

Class discussion this week was dictated by Miguel de Unamuno’s The Tragic Sense of Life and Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. Beginning with Unamuno’s philosophical struggle between logic and passion, we are presented with the notion that strife in living is inevitable. That is, everyone at some point is going to encounter struggles within their everyday lives; however, certain conditions can produce more or less strife. For example, Unamuno wants to point out that “but whoever is convinced that he is sailing, perhaps without a set course, on an unstable or sinkable craft, will not be daunted if he finds the deck giving way beneath his feet and threatening to sink” (Unamuno in Solomon, 158). Yet, I would stress the point that this does not necessarily entail that the individual without a set course in his life is without any worries. This type of person still experiences pain and strife within his or her life that is certainly complex and confusing, but I feel that Unamuno wants it to be understood that this pain will be substantially less than that of the fanatics. But who are the fanatics?

            Unamuno wants to express that individuals tend to get their motivations and morals from a sort of pre-packaged set. We can identify these as “dogmas” which people tend to give in and identify with. However, to Unamuno, this is not something that should be praised with approval. Rather, “virtue, therefore, is not based upon dogma, but dogma upon virtue, and it is not faith which creates martyrs but rather martyrs who create faith” Unamuno in Solomon, 159). That is, the doctrines by which each and every one of us use to describe ourselves is nothing more than an attempt to justify our actions to others. Unamuno describes how this is so when describing how a man may justify his morals in fear of being damned into eternal hellfire. However, Unamuno wants to show that even in the absence of believing in hellfire, or the idea that he may experience such a place, this man will simply come up with another alternative for explaining and justifying his actions or morals.

            From here I still want to return to this notion of the fanatics. Unamuno states that “whoever bases or thinks he bases his conduct – his inner or outward conduct, his feeling or his action – on  a dogma or theoretical principle which he deems incontrovertible, runs the risk of being a fanatic” Unamuno in Solomon, 158). Even so, why would a fanatic experience more pain? To Unamuno, the amount of pain can be associated with life can be identified with the groundwork for which one justifies their actions. A fanatic subscribes to a dogma to justify the way in which they live, however if she finds the groundwork for her morals to begin to shake, the fall appears to be much more tremendous than someone who is not a fanatic. Therefore, it would appear as if the idea of the fanatic is to be associated with more pain than someone who believes that “by acting thus he will make it true, prove it true, and that by thus acting he will create his spiritual world” (Unamuno in Solomon, 158).

            Turning to Heidegger, we understand that there is a sense of a similarity to that of the philosophical approach of Unamuno. To be quite honest, I found Heidegger’s writing style to be more than a bit confusing and difficult to read. Nevertheless, I still want to return to one of the very first class discussion questions from group 16, that being whether or not we should believe that a dog has da-sein. To answer this, I found it odd that no one appeared to desire to return to Kierkegaard’s examples of the ethical and aesthetic life. I would indeed agree that one of the greatest determinants of da-sein would be the capability of understanding mortality. Along with this, since human beings appear to be the only creatures that know that we are going to die, I would argue that only humans can have da-sein. Yet, I feel that this does not go far enough.

            I feel that another determinant for da-sein should be the ability to contemplate life. Interestingly enough, this appears to be the kind of determinant that we saw from the ethical life portrayed by Kierkegaard. Compared to the aesthetic life that can most easily be explained within the life of an animal such as a dog, I would argue that many of the same qualities of the ethical life are indeed contained within da-sein. To counter what an individual during class discussion stated about dogs fearing for their life when they retreat: why would you have any reason to believe that the dog understands mortality? Wouldn’t it be more likely that the dog fears the experience of pain, rather than the extremely complicated and philosophical notion of life and the desire to preserve it?

            I believe that da-sein has an extremely important impact on the further examination of authentic and inauthentic life. While I want to return to this in more detail on next week’s blog, I feel that it is important to bring up the point that Heidegger more than likely would feel that modernization has created the circumstances in which people are thrown into a particular society that has created certain social standards. These standards tell us how to live, and how to shape our morals. To Heidegger, this would be the creation of an inauthentic life; a life that should be compared to one which can be won. By winning, it is meant that we have chosen our own value in absence of external influence. But more on this later. 

Reflection for October 28 - Dostoevsky

     The readings by Dostoevsky for this week certainly had a prevailing theme of freedom and how this idea of freedom interacts with our increasingly scientific society. To begin, it appeared that the first group instructed the class to inquire as to what can be considered a reasonable advantage. While the answers that we can up with as a class were mostly predictable, Dostoevsky takes this idea of an advantage and truly asks the reader to consider it in a unique way. From here, the notion of the most advantageous advantage is introduced as something most admirable. But what is the most advantageous advantage?
  Dostoevsky appears to present the most advantageous advantage in the fallowing way: “but I repeat for the hundredth time, there is one case, one only, when man may purposely, consciously, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very stupid – simply in order to have the right to desire for himself even what is very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is rational” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 45). That is, this most advantageous advantage appears to be presented in a way that hinges on a functioning free will. Without the freedom to choose that which is rationally ridiculous, humans appear to be nothing more than mathematically predictably machines. Without free will, we would not choose by choice, but by those rules or laws which dictate how we should choose. However, this is a problematic theme, for as Dostoevsky points out, “for who would want to choose by rule? Besides, he will at once be transformed from a human being into an organ stop or something of the sort; for what is a man without desire, without free will and without choice” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 44).
     So it would appear as if we can associate this idea of the most advantageous advantage with a simple automaton. Yet, would you argue that this advantageous advantage should really be recognized as simply that, an advantage? What about the idea that a true free will is accompanied by the realization of a crushing amount of responsibility. To many (or the weak class of individuals which was discussed by the second portion of class), a life of knowing such a free will may produce pain and suffering. As Dostoevsky point out, “consequently we have only to discover these laws of nature, and man will no longer be responsible for his actions, and life will become exceedingly easy for him” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 42).
This notion of responsibility and how it should be considered a by-product of free will is a good point to transfer attention to the previously mentioned idea of a weak and strong class. Yet, these two terms appear ambiguous on their face value, so how should we differentiate between the week and the strong? To be sure, a great starting point for identifying these two classes can be found within the parable of the Grand Inquisitor. Here, the Church appears to take the role of the strong, while the weak appear to be those that are fed earthly pleasures. In other words, it almost appears as if the deciding factor for these two classes is how one considers and handles the notion of their own free will.
We are presented with the story of Christ and how he had resisted the three temptations presented by Satan. In resisting these three temptations, Christ seems to have affirmed the notion of free will for all. Once again, however, this can be argued to be problematic in the sense that some people can be seen to be naturally weak, while some can be seen as naturally strong. The weak appear to be those who have an underlying necessity to fallow those that can ease their suffering in their current life. That is, free will and the idea that your fate is fully within your control is a massively heavy idea which cannot be fully embraced by all. They need someone to turn to, someone that can provide for them. This is the case in the parable in which the Church provides for their followers, certainly to the extent in which Christ is portrayed as now being an unnecessary element of the church.
The final point that I wish to make in this essay relates to the differentiation between the weak and strong class that is portrayed in Dostoevsky’s work and the master and slave moralities which were introduced by Nietzsche. Once again, I would argue that the difference between these two classifications hinges on the notion of freedom. Nietzsche takes a strong stance when references the master and slave moralities, in which you can see how he would most likely reference the master morality as being distinctly better than a slave morality. These moralities function along with the will to power, and the ubermensch. So for Nietzsche, the ubermensch is something to strive for, and the master morality is certainly something that is more admirable than a slave morality. However, I do not think that this is even close to what Dostoevsky is referencing with the use of a weak and a strong class. To me, the weak and strong classes are used to illustrate that there are always going to be those individuals that have an underlying necessity to fallow those that can provide for them. Those that can provide the earthly pleasure and dull the suffering are the strong, while the weak are those that fallow.

Reflection for October 7 - Nietzsche

            The writings from Nietzsche this week were by no means light. They have provoked some of the most serious thoughts about consciousness and individuality that I have encountered in my life. One of these first considerations was drawn from Nietzsche’s parable of the “madman.” In this, the madman asserts that God is dead, that indeed, we are the murderers of God. Needing of addressing, however, is who this God is. Are we speaking of the actual God in all of his omnipotence? I would believe that this is certainly not the case. Yet, who is this God, and how are we, the individuals of society, responsible for killing him (or it)?

            To proceed from what I believe to be the most logical starting point, I want to first address when we might have killed God. Here I believe that God is symbolic for traditional values. That is, God represents those values that have been embedded within society and encrypted as the norms that we see to be present. So, when might we have killed him? I would agree with one classmate who brought up the idea that this might have been during the enlightenment. That is, the enlightenment can be seen as a historical turning point in which society begins to shift away from superstitious ideas and embraces scientific rhetoric. We reject the use of skepticism and highlight our ability to use empiricism and epistemological outlooks.

            But now we must interpret what the madman means when he states that he is too early. He states that “this tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men” (Nietzsche in Solomon, 67). By this, it is emphasized that the ubermensch is not prevalent, at least not at a collective level. This idea of the ubermensch is highlighted within the philosophers, those individuals who feel a sense of relief when they believe that “all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again” (Nietzsche in Solomon, 68). This was an issue that was highlighted in class discussion and provoked a lot of differing perspectives. To many, the death of the “old God” should be seen as a good thing in the sense that the old God can be representative of outdated values that should be cast aside in order to make more room for a “new God,” One that is more representative of how current society functions.

            Yet, if Nietzsche can be said to represent the philosophers in this parable (as well as the underlying idea of the ubermensch), why would he be so excited to witness the death of the old God if it simply meant reconstructing a new one. After all, morality is taught to be a functioning concept within the structure of the herd mentality. These new values (simply dressed up morals) designed within the new God are once more a product of the herd, which is precisely the antithesis of what Nietzsche is trying to express when advocating for the ultimate goal of the ubermensch. For this precise reason, I don’t believe that Nietzsche is advocating for the creation of a new God in totality. Rather, I think that he acknowledges, at least to some extent, that achieving the ubermensch on a collective level is something that we may never reach. In other words, the madman will always be too early.

            Furthermore, consciousness and language are two conceptions that Nietzsche emphasizes within his writings. The question as to whether or not happiness is an invention of human creation was most definitely able to produce some class discussion. I believe that this is a difficult question to address since empiricism is something difficult to demonstrate in this instance. However, pressed to answer I would lean more towards the idea that no, happiness is purely relation to emotions. While the class discussion had established that language is a given for consciousness (consciousness if and only if language), it does not entail that a state of being (an emotion) does not exist without it. There is a fact of the matter as to the state of my being. That is, I currently feel something at a particular moment whether or not I can describe it.

            This is not to say that what makes me happy is not a product of human creation. This would be a much more difficult theme to argue. I simply believe that it does not matter what form happiness takes, there is a fact of the matter and it exists outside of its various forms regardless of whether or not we can communicate the feeling. 

Reflection for September 30 - Kierkegaard

Class discussion for this week was dominated by Kierkegaard’s ideas involving faith, subjectivity, and the three spheres of life, among other various themes that he has held to be important. As is extremely apparent from the class discussion itself, these concepts are very difficult to grasp, and Kierkegaard even essentially states that he writes for the few that can understand him. That being said, I believe the works by Kierkegaard that are under examination for this week’s reading are very difficult to comprehend, but allow for a very deep and philosophical discussion.

            I wanted to begin with a question posed by Kierkegaard himself, which was used by group 7 in their presentation. Kierkegaard poses the question that “if one who lives in the midst of Christianity goes up to the House of God, to the House of the true God, with knowledge of the true conception of God, and now prays, but prays in untruth; and when one lives in a godless country, but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is the most truth?” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 19). This question may appear to be difficult to discern, however, under further examination it becomes clear where the most truth lies for Kierkegaard.

            This can be explained to be so by Kierkegaard himself when saying that “only in subjectivity is there decision, whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the infinite is the deciding factor, not its content, for its content in just itself” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). Thus, we can see that Kierkegaard would most certainly identify the latter individual in the thought experiment posed earlier as having the most truth. But why is this? This was a critical question for many in the class. Why doesn’t the individual who holds the actual fact of the matter (knowledge of the true conception of God) have the most truth? As Thad was quick to point out to the student who brought this point up, you have to omit the latter part of the first description to maintain that standpoint. The truth held by the first individual is undermined by his praying in untruth. That is, regardless of the fact that he holds true conceptions of God, his praying in untruth outweighs the infinite passion of the latter.

            Once again, I believe that it would be fair to say that content is not necessarily important for truth according to Kierkegaard. He believes subjectivity is related to finding a decision whereas objectivity is blinding. “If I can grasp God objectively, I do not have faith, but just because I cannot do that, therefore I must have faith” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). So truth is not related to objectivity, but rather the infinite passion expressed through subjectivity. What Kierkegaard is saying here is that without risk, there is no faith because if you could objectively grasp something, there would be no risk. Since the conceptualization of God by man is absurd, one cannot objectively grasp God. Therefore to identify oneself within a religious sphere of life, one must take a leap of faith of sorts. They must acknowledge the fact that Christianity is fundamentally paradoxical, and live through infinite passion. Yet, as was stated earlier, even if the faith was in fact false it would not entail untruth because truth lies in the subjective passion.

            This leads into the analysis provided by Robert Solomon concerning Kierkegaard’s three phases of life. From here I wanted to make a point that I was not able to make in class since I figured there was a very good possibility that I was wrong and shouldn't run the risk of embarrassing myself. The idea was constantly brought up that Kierkegaard almost presents these three spheres of life in a way in which the individual should progress through them in a systematic way. However I do not necessarily agree with this idea. Kierkegaard may assert that the shortcomings of one sphere of life may lead an individual to change their perceptions and, therefore, to move to a different sphere, but he never says that this is required. In fact, he seems to press the idea that no one has any good reason to choose one sphere of existence over another.

            Solomon further explains this idea by stating that “Kierkegaard, unlike Hegel, never argues that the movement from state to stage is necessary or that is can be demonstrated systematically” (Solomon, 1972, 93). Yet, class discussion kept pushing the idea that the aesthetic sphere would be encompassed by the ethical sphere, which would subsequently be encompassed by the religious sphere. I don’t believe this is what Kierkegaard is saying at all. While many people tried to come up with examples of what someone in both spheres would look like (a person’s desire to become a doctor for ulterior motives beyond helping people, while still holding the ethical standpoint of being able to help people was one of them), I think the main idea that is overlooked is the state of mind under consideration.

            This state of mind or the motives for doing something is what is necessary to identify if you wish to understand which sphere of life a certain individual should fit in. In the thought experiment of the self-interested doctor, I would say they are most certainly within the aesthetic sphere of life. This is because I believe, as I also think Kierkegaard believes, one cannot be within two spheres at the same time, just as no person can be in two different places at the same particular instance. The self-interested doctor is within the aesthetic sphere of life solely because he/she does not consider the collective interests of the community. Even if they did consider these communitarian interests, the self-interested motivations to become a doctor heavily outweigh the byproduct of being able to help people, and thus, would exclude them from the possibility of being within the ethical sphere of life. 

Reflection for September 23, Camus and Kierkegaard

            The reflection for this week has a primary emphasis on the last pages of The Fall by Albert Camus and the first few ideas by Soren Kierkegaard found within the textbook. Following up from my consideration of last week’s post on The Fall, I wanted to continue off of the already asserted theme of dominance that is identifiable within the character of Jean-Baptiste. More importantly, what follows from this theme is the concept of judgment. Yet still more importantly, who has the ability to judge? This is critically relevant in the theme of The Fall and something that appears to be answered by Jean-Baptiste himself. Jean-Baptiste appears to function from the position that judgment is a sort of hypocritical position. This idea of hypocritical judgment can be explained through the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity.

            From here, I want to take a brief pause to examine a remark made by an individual during class discussion. Within the discussion itself, this individual made a remark that essentially alleged that no statement can escape the grasp of subjectivity. Or, in other words, that subjectivity is apparent in any statement, including facts. Yet, as Thad and many other students were quick to point out, that statement is completely false. There are most certainly objective statements (i.e. indisputable facts). Therefore, the idea of obtaining a high level objectivity, according to Jean-Baptiste, is essential to the relevance of judgment. More narrowly-tailored, Jean-Baptiste believes that the recognition of one’s own guilt will subsequently create the ability to maintain objectivity in judgment. The idea of subjective judgment becomes apparent following the event of hearing laughter on the bridge. This laughter is representative of society’s acknowledgment that his judgment is subjective, and therefore, irrelevant. Thus, Jean-Baptiste is searching for this objective judgment. He understands that he cannot pass judgment on others without first passing judgment upon himself. This is crucial to the idea that Jean-Baptiste is a “Judge-penitent.” He reserves the right to judge others, but only because he first acknowledges his own problems and imperfections and judges them accordingly.

Aside from the notion of judgment, slavery is also a reappearing theme that has an intense function within The Fall. This idea of slavery was a theme brought up within class discussion, and I believe useful for understanding the final passage of The Fall as well as being a good transition into the works of Kierkegaard. The idea of slavery is very much similar to the idea of relief. Slavery is relief from obligation. While the final few lines of the story state “but let’s not worry! It’s too late now. It will always be too late. Fortunately!” (Camus, 45), we can see that Jean-Baptiste is most likely aware of the fact that if presented with the situation over again, that there is a very good possibility that he would once again not take action. However, there is no need to worry because there is no chance of this. So, this knowledge of a past you are unable to change is consistent with the idea of slavery as well as portraying the fact that Jean-Baptiste is not a perfect human being.

Similar to my reflection essay for last week, this week’s readings only incorporated a little bit of Kierkegaard’s works, and therefore I will only briefly discuss some of the main themes of these first works, while reserving next week’s reflection for the rest. To begin, Kierkegaard asserts that there are essentially three distinguishable forms of life: The aesthetic, ethical, and religious. He goes on to point out that the third phase, the religious life, is admirable and ultimately a form of life that can only be acquired by passing through the other forms. These distinctions of forms of life may be relevant to the idea that Kierkegaard wanted to point out the differences between being a Christian and becoming a Christian. In other words, he wanted to point out that many individuals were born into the life of Christianity and their identity as a Christian was more likely to be shaped and sculpted as a social identity.

While the aesthetic and ethical lives are very interesting, Kierkegaard wants to point out what it means to become a Christian. This religious phase of life is emphasized in relation to the themes of reason and existence. In the words of Kierkegaard himself, “can one demonstrate that to be a rational actuality which is at odds with reason? Of course not, unless one would contradict oneself. One can only prove that it is at odds with reason” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 28). Following from this, and something that I find extremely interesting, is the idea that one does not prove their faith or existence through reason, but “one proves his presence by the attitude of submission, which may have many different forms according to the customs of the country” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 28). This is what is most important to Kierkegaard in this section.

Reflection for September 16

The readings for this week included The Myth of Sisyphus and The Fall by Albert Camus. While The Fall was much lengthier, and provided more content for analysis, I sincerely believe that I connected with The Myth of Sisyphus on a personal level. For that reason, I believe that the majority of the analysis here will have an emphasis on this particular reading.

            To begin with this analysis of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus functions from the position that the most important question to be answered is that of the meaning of life. Yet, as he points out, it is not simply the meaning of life that is relevant here, but rather how the meaning of life has a crucial relation with that of the act of suicide. To make this relevance known, Camus introduces the reader with the concept of absurdity. When speaking of the habitual life that so many people can identify with, a life of simple predictability and continual rhythm, there comes a time when “the ‘why’ arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement” (Camus in Solomon, 191). This questioning of the meaning in one’s life and actions begins what can be considered the chain of events that distances an individual from what the actor originally thought of as a well-known world. He begins to feel an outsider in his environment, indeed, similar to how Meursault in The Stranger is identified as an outsider in terms of how he refuses to conform to societal norms and customs.

            From here, Camus proposes the solution, that “at the end of awakening comes, in time, the consequence: suicide or recovery” (Camus in Solomon, 191). Here, I wanted to take the opportunity to explain something that I did not get a chance to say during class discussion. At a certain point an individual in the class seemed to insinuate that Camus proposes that there is no meaning in life and that he “wants you to kill yourself.” Certainly I think Camus proposes the first part of that conditional, however I seriously think that this individual that made this point does not understand what Camus believes to be the logical consequence of consciousness. He very clearly point out that “it may be thought that suicide follows revolt- but wrongly. For it does not represent the logical outcome of revolt. It is just the contrary by the consent it presupposes. Suicide, like the leap, is acceptance at its extreme” (Camus in Solomon, 193). Thus, while Camus may propose that life will be better lived once we acknowledge the fact that there is no meaning to life at all, he does NOT believe that suicide is a logical response.

            Camus is simply pointing to the fact and the acknowledgement that such a meaningless life is a precursor of sorts to an act of suicide for some people. They realize that life is devoid of any reason to live, and in turn, make the conscious decision to take their lives based upon the feeling that life is not worth the trouble. Yet, what would a life look like without any meaning? Can an individual come to grips with this reality and still be happy? I would certainly say yes to the latter question, as I believe Camus would, and to the former question, I believe we can point to Meursault’s absurd worldview in The Stranger to illustrate such a life. Towards the end of the novel, and in the face of the chaplain, Meursault brings the realization of the meaningless in life to light, by pointing out the fact that he had chosen to live his life a certain way. He certainly could have made different choices, done different things, but he didn’t. And with this, he states that he would do it all over again. In other words, the experiences in life are what matter, and this is what can bring happiness. Just as we must believe that Sisyphus is happy with his meaningless work, we must believe that the meaningless actions that we take in life which produce no real significance can also bring us joy. The path we make in life is irrelevant; it is simply the experience that matters.

            As for The Fall, the real significance that I got out of this reading was the idea that Jean-Baptiste, while making many choices to benefit or help others, can still be considered a hypocrite. A question posed by group 4 was whether at the beginning of the novel we would describe Jean-Batiste as a selfish or selfless man. The significance of this question arises out of the fact that many of these supposedly “selfless” acts were done out of a selfish desire to feel above others in a way. That is, by helping others Jean-Baptiste is fulfilling a deeply-needed desire to assert his dominance. To be sure, the point was made by someone in the classroom that you most definitely cannot label someone as selfless when they describe themselves as selfless. While I have a lot more to say about The Fall, and subsequently the realization of how every individual is implicated within seemingly unconnected spheres of events, I am going to reserve these ideas for next week’s blog. However, to end this blog, I wanted to point out that I seriously believe that almost every individual in the world can identify with the early Jean-Baptiste portrayed in The Fall. Can anyone really ever really say that they have performed a selfless act with absolute certainty? 

Reflection for September 9 - The Stranger

This particular piece written by Albert Camus certainly presents what can constitute a “difficult” character. Beginning with the identity of Meursault, the reader is presented with a main character that is somewhat unique in terms of how he interacts with his environment. Part one of The Stranger familiarizes us with some of these things that make Meursault such an unfamiliar human being. When he comes upon his mother’s casket during her vigil, he declines the offer made to open it up in order to view her body. He smokes and drinks coffee during the vigil, remains void of any expression of grief during her funeral, begins a relationship with a woman the very next day, etc. The portrayal would indeed seem to be that of a sociopath. The reader begins to question why this particular agent in life is making these choices. This leads us to infer that Meursault does not neatly fit into the perceptions of what constitutes a normal life, which is dictated by societal norms.

            Focusing on the idea of why Meursault acts the way he does, we can use the casket during the vigil as a good starting point. A point was brought up by Robbie in my group discussion up that the reason that Meursault chose to leave the casket closed hinges on his idea of life and what happens after you die. Meursault is certainly what you would classify as an atheist. That is, when someone dies he believes that is the end. Therefore, what would be the point in opening the casket? While for most people the opening of the casket and the visualization of the deceased body can bring about a much needed feeling of closure, to Meursault, viewing the body is simply not necessary. It makes no difference. This idea of indifference is later reinforced in the short story during his trial for shooting the Arab multiple times, and killing him. Everyone is perplexed and simply stuck on the issue as to why Meursault had shot the Arab four more times after he had more than likely already killed him with the first shot, but Meursault is actually mystified as to why it makes any difference at all. This confusion creates a surprising amount of tension with people as they try to assign a reason to an action devoid of any reason at all.

            Yet, why does Meursault think this way? A point in our class discussion turned to an individual in the class stating that Meursault can be described almost as a robot, or someone incapable of feeling or thinking critically. While I would more than likely agree with the first part of the description of Meursault, I would very much disagree with the latter. Meursault is an individual that is very much capable of thinking critically, interacting with his environment, and arriving at difficult conclusions. This is evident from the very beginning of the short story after he apologizes to his employer for asking for a couple of days of leave, Meursault says that “afterwards it struck me I needn’t have said that. I had no reason to excuse myself; it was up to him to express his sympathy and so forth” (Camus, 4). Thus, we can see that Meursault is certainly an intelligent individual, simply incapable of understanding emotions. In a way, it almost appears as if he is above emotional response (a subjective view), and is actually capable in staying objective when interacting with particular events in his life.

            This is why I was not necessarily thrilled when the class discussion turned to whether or not we should view Meursault as evolutionarily superior or inferior. This matter is a matter of opinion and is subject to the context in which it is involved. Certainly we wish to stay objective in many situations in life, separating ourselves from emotions which may blind us from arriving at a more defensible decision. On the other hand, the meaning of life seems to dwindle when we approach the idea of a life without emotional interactions. In other words, the idea of Meursault being evolutionarily inferior or superior is not something that can be measured since all of the variables cannot be assigned real values.

A question that I did find particularly intriguing concerning Meursault was posed during Group 2’s discussion which stated: “Throughout the course of the novel, Meursault approaches the deep moments in his life (death of his mother, marriage, murder, ect.) with severe indifference. In your opinion, what is it about the chaplain's visit which evokes such a "blind rage" within him?” To me, this blind rage stems from the issue of identifying exactly who the stranger is in this short story. This particular piece of evidence, to me, points to the idea that the stranger is most definitely Meursault himself. He struggles with his own identity throughout the story and seemingly positions himself in that of an observer. That is, he puts himself in a situation where he views his environment and surroundings and is definitely intrigued by it, but has difficulty understanding “why”. Whereas most people find their identity to be reinforced by the perceptions of the society around them, Meursault cannot. He lacks the emotional factor which influences this. To me, this is why he enters a state of blind rage in the face of the chaplain. The chaplain wants Meursault to assign meaning to his actions and come to face his identity of a person. I think that the very fact that Meursault is incapable of doing this is what incites this anger. 

August 26, 2013

The philosophical school and concept of existentialism is certainly not something that an average person may consider in their everyday life. Yet, it is certainly interesting how this is so following from the idea that existentialism has a central focus on existence on the individual level. While there are more than just a few ways to consider the challenging subject of existentialism, I found it extremely interesting as to how “every act and every attitude must be considered a choice. Yet, the existential attitude itself is apparently not chose. One finds oneself in it” (Solomon, XIV, 2005). So, every single one of us is to be considered a sovereign and freely-thinking agent that makes decisions according to our own choices, but our attitude concerning the existential philosophy is not. At this point in the semester of PHI 304, I find it hard to believe that I would be alone in scratching my head when contemplating what we can consider to be a good definition of existentialism. The definition that Thad had posted briefly on the screen did very little in terms of solidifying and single or coherent definition, but I am sure that as the semester progresses, so will my understanding of many difficult concepts within the school of existentialism and the concept of existentialism itself.

As many would have guessed, this blog is going to be dedicated to the course PHI 304 (Existentialism) that I am currently taking at Arizona State University. Speaking in terms of the course structure itself, I am definitely curious as to how this semester will play out. I have had the opportunity to take Thad before in PHI 101 and PHI 105. Phi 105 offered a class structure similar to this which turned out to be great for class participation and class discussion. While group work may not always be my favorite thing in a university, I still welcome the challenge of working with peers and seeing what everyone else can bring to the table from their own unique challenges and experiences. My group (group 3) will be presenting our topic of the Myth of Sisyphus on Sep. 16, which I have little prior knowledge on, but am extremely enthusiastic about and am very excited to hear where our discussion will go in the class.

            I truly believe that this class is going to be extremely different from any other course that I have taken at a university, both in content and in structure. While I have a bit of anxiety about getting in front of an entire room full of strangers who will be actively judging the merits of what I have to present to them, I am also aware of what this course has to offer in terms of how I perceive life and the choices that can be made in my life. Many of the philosophers that are on the assigned reading list I have not had a chance to read. However I have had the chance to read much of Friedrich Nietzsche’s work, and while I find much of it to be disturbing and disagreeable, I realize that these are the kind of readings that I most enjoy. These kinds of philosophical writers have a way to stimulate the reader, forcing them to constantly question their reality and what they hold to be true or real to them. This is what I look forward to most in this course. Any university can offer a course in which you learn material and later regurgitate said material later in the semester. This course and the material within this course offer a chance to grow and alter the way in which we perceive our everyday life, all while breaking the norm of examinations within a normal classroom structure, and because of this I am very excited.