Reflection for November 18 - Heidegger

      Continuing from last week’s discussion of Heidegger, this discussion will primarily function from Heidegger’s position concerning how Da-sein relates to the concept of death. We have already covered this conceptualization of Da-sein and how it closely resembles the idea that an individual is aware, and open to the world in a sort of liquid-like state. That is, Da-sein is something that we strive for in our everyday lives. Interestingly enough, Heidegger and Nietzsche are similar in this sense. Whereas the elements of Da-sein are something to strive for, the ubermensch described by Nietzsche is similarly relevant. Heidegger claims that philosophy is for the few, that is, it is an extremely complicated way of approaching ideas which has the tendency to break down societal norms. I may return to this more later, however, for now I simply want to make the point that Da-sein is an extremely complicated concept in which death, consequently, plays a large role.
  Generally speaking, death is the totality of being. That is, it is the completion of the experience of Da-sein. Heidegger writes that “the transition to no-longer-being-there lifts Da-sein right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. This kind of thing is denied to actual Da-sein in relation to itself” (Heidegger in Solomon, 139). This is an extremely interesting point in the sense that Heidegger wants to show that although death is your own, you cannot and do not experience your own death. Rather, people interact with the concept of death through the loss of a life that is around them. According to Heidegger, “death does not reveal itself as a loss, but as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the loss of being as such which the dying person ‘suffers’ does not become accessible. We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just ‘there’ too” (Heidegger in Solomon, 140).
  This, however, creates the issue how we should feel about our lives in the face of death. Class discussion was quite heated around this topic as one classmate pointed to the fact that we can ultimately never grasp death until we are essentially faced with it. I believe that I would agree with this idea in the sense that I do not feel as if I can truly understand how I would consider my life in its totality in the face of death. In other words, while I may have a certain idea of how I would feel about my life in such a circumstance (more than likely overwhelmed with anxiety that everything that I have done or learned in my life was not put to a more practical use), I cannot be certain that this is actually how I would feel when genuinely facing the ultimate end of my being.
Rather than having a complete conceptualization of death, I believe that the authenticity which relates to death in Heidegger’s writing is more concerned with being aware of the “indefinite certainty of death.” This certainty and how it relates to Da-sein is explained that by “anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself to a constant threat arising from its own there. Being-towards-the-end must hold itself in this very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty” (Heidegger in Solomon, 144). Therefore, I would argue that authenticity relating to death in the way that Heidegger explains it does not necessarily require the individual to have an ultimate grasp of how we would consider our lives in the face of death, nor does it require us to have a grasp of the experience of our own death. Rather, we should have an understanding of our indefinite certainty of death, which is the totality of our Da-sein and how this produces authenticity.
From here, I wanted to briefly discuss the idea that philosophy is useless in a certain degree. Heidegger grants this idea, but goes on to point out that what is useless can still be a force. When speaking of this, he asserts that “philosophy can never directly supply the energies and create the opportunities and methods that bring about historical change… It spreads only indirectly, by devious paths that can never be laid out in advance, until at last, at some future date, it sinks to the level of a commonplace” (Heidegger in Solomon, 148-149). However, when speaking of this, I do not believe that Heidegger desires to establish philosophy as a completely unnecessary practice.
      Science and mathematics are practices which are objective and can “do” things. In other words, Heidegger wants to point out that you cannot necessarily do anything with philosophy as you can with objective sciences, but this is not important. What is important is what philosophy can do with the individual. Philosophers can indirectly promote society by inquiring into the “extra-ordinary.” As I discussed at the beginning of this essay, philosophers in this sense are similar to the madman depicted in the parable by Nietzsche. Heidegger makes many references to timing when speaking of philosophy, and in this sense, it is similar because philosophers will always be too early. So, even though philosophy has a tendency to make things more difficult and can be considered useless on a rudimentary level, we can still conclude that it is worth doing.