Reflection for September 30 - Kierkegaard

Class discussion for this week was dominated by Kierkegaard’s ideas involving faith, subjectivity, and the three spheres of life, among other various themes that he has held to be important. As is extremely apparent from the class discussion itself, these concepts are very difficult to grasp, and Kierkegaard even essentially states that he writes for the few that can understand him. That being said, I believe the works by Kierkegaard that are under examination for this week’s reading are very difficult to comprehend, but allow for a very deep and philosophical discussion.

            I wanted to begin with a question posed by Kierkegaard himself, which was used by group 7 in their presentation. Kierkegaard poses the question that “if one who lives in the midst of Christianity goes up to the House of God, to the House of the true God, with knowledge of the true conception of God, and now prays, but prays in untruth; and when one lives in a godless country, but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is the most truth?” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 19). This question may appear to be difficult to discern, however, under further examination it becomes clear where the most truth lies for Kierkegaard.

            This can be explained to be so by Kierkegaard himself when saying that “only in subjectivity is there decision, whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the infinite is the deciding factor, not its content, for its content in just itself” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). Thus, we can see that Kierkegaard would most certainly identify the latter individual in the thought experiment posed earlier as having the most truth. But why is this? This was a critical question for many in the class. Why doesn’t the individual who holds the actual fact of the matter (knowledge of the true conception of God) have the most truth? As Thad was quick to point out to the student who brought this point up, you have to omit the latter part of the first description to maintain that standpoint. The truth held by the first individual is undermined by his praying in untruth. That is, regardless of the fact that he holds true conceptions of God, his praying in untruth outweighs the infinite passion of the latter.

            Once again, I believe that it would be fair to say that content is not necessarily important for truth according to Kierkegaard. He believes subjectivity is related to finding a decision whereas objectivity is blinding. “If I can grasp God objectively, I do not have faith, but just because I cannot do that, therefore I must have faith” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). So truth is not related to objectivity, but rather the infinite passion expressed through subjectivity. What Kierkegaard is saying here is that without risk, there is no faith because if you could objectively grasp something, there would be no risk. Since the conceptualization of God by man is absurd, one cannot objectively grasp God. Therefore to identify oneself within a religious sphere of life, one must take a leap of faith of sorts. They must acknowledge the fact that Christianity is fundamentally paradoxical, and live through infinite passion. Yet, as was stated earlier, even if the faith was in fact false it would not entail untruth because truth lies in the subjective passion.

            This leads into the analysis provided by Robert Solomon concerning Kierkegaard’s three phases of life. From here I wanted to make a point that I was not able to make in class since I figured there was a very good possibility that I was wrong and shouldn't run the risk of embarrassing myself. The idea was constantly brought up that Kierkegaard almost presents these three spheres of life in a way in which the individual should progress through them in a systematic way. However I do not necessarily agree with this idea. Kierkegaard may assert that the shortcomings of one sphere of life may lead an individual to change their perceptions and, therefore, to move to a different sphere, but he never says that this is required. In fact, he seems to press the idea that no one has any good reason to choose one sphere of existence over another.

            Solomon further explains this idea by stating that “Kierkegaard, unlike Hegel, never argues that the movement from state to stage is necessary or that is can be demonstrated systematically” (Solomon, 1972, 93). Yet, class discussion kept pushing the idea that the aesthetic sphere would be encompassed by the ethical sphere, which would subsequently be encompassed by the religious sphere. I don’t believe this is what Kierkegaard is saying at all. While many people tried to come up with examples of what someone in both spheres would look like (a person’s desire to become a doctor for ulterior motives beyond helping people, while still holding the ethical standpoint of being able to help people was one of them), I think the main idea that is overlooked is the state of mind under consideration.

            This state of mind or the motives for doing something is what is necessary to identify if you wish to understand which sphere of life a certain individual should fit in. In the thought experiment of the self-interested doctor, I would say they are most certainly within the aesthetic sphere of life. This is because I believe, as I also think Kierkegaard believes, one cannot be within two spheres at the same time, just as no person can be in two different places at the same particular instance. The self-interested doctor is within the aesthetic sphere of life solely because he/she does not consider the collective interests of the community. Even if they did consider these communitarian interests, the self-interested motivations to become a doctor heavily outweigh the byproduct of being able to help people, and thus, would exclude them from the possibility of being within the ethical sphere of life.