Reflection for October 28 - Dostoevsky

     The readings by Dostoevsky for this week certainly had a prevailing theme of freedom and how this idea of freedom interacts with our increasingly scientific society. To begin, it appeared that the first group instructed the class to inquire as to what can be considered a reasonable advantage. While the answers that we can up with as a class were mostly predictable, Dostoevsky takes this idea of an advantage and truly asks the reader to consider it in a unique way. From here, the notion of the most advantageous advantage is introduced as something most admirable. But what is the most advantageous advantage?
  Dostoevsky appears to present the most advantageous advantage in the fallowing way: “but I repeat for the hundredth time, there is one case, one only, when man may purposely, consciously, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very stupid – simply in order to have the right to desire for himself even what is very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is rational” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 45). That is, this most advantageous advantage appears to be presented in a way that hinges on a functioning free will. Without the freedom to choose that which is rationally ridiculous, humans appear to be nothing more than mathematically predictably machines. Without free will, we would not choose by choice, but by those rules or laws which dictate how we should choose. However, this is a problematic theme, for as Dostoevsky points out, “for who would want to choose by rule? Besides, he will at once be transformed from a human being into an organ stop or something of the sort; for what is a man without desire, without free will and without choice” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 44).
     So it would appear as if we can associate this idea of the most advantageous advantage with a simple automaton. Yet, would you argue that this advantageous advantage should really be recognized as simply that, an advantage? What about the idea that a true free will is accompanied by the realization of a crushing amount of responsibility. To many (or the weak class of individuals which was discussed by the second portion of class), a life of knowing such a free will may produce pain and suffering. As Dostoevsky point out, “consequently we have only to discover these laws of nature, and man will no longer be responsible for his actions, and life will become exceedingly easy for him” (Dostoevsky in Solomon, 42).
This notion of responsibility and how it should be considered a by-product of free will is a good point to transfer attention to the previously mentioned idea of a weak and strong class. Yet, these two terms appear ambiguous on their face value, so how should we differentiate between the week and the strong? To be sure, a great starting point for identifying these two classes can be found within the parable of the Grand Inquisitor. Here, the Church appears to take the role of the strong, while the weak appear to be those that are fed earthly pleasures. In other words, it almost appears as if the deciding factor for these two classes is how one considers and handles the notion of their own free will.
We are presented with the story of Christ and how he had resisted the three temptations presented by Satan. In resisting these three temptations, Christ seems to have affirmed the notion of free will for all. Once again, however, this can be argued to be problematic in the sense that some people can be seen to be naturally weak, while some can be seen as naturally strong. The weak appear to be those who have an underlying necessity to fallow those that can ease their suffering in their current life. That is, free will and the idea that your fate is fully within your control is a massively heavy idea which cannot be fully embraced by all. They need someone to turn to, someone that can provide for them. This is the case in the parable in which the Church provides for their followers, certainly to the extent in which Christ is portrayed as now being an unnecessary element of the church.
The final point that I wish to make in this essay relates to the differentiation between the weak and strong class that is portrayed in Dostoevsky’s work and the master and slave moralities which were introduced by Nietzsche. Once again, I would argue that the difference between these two classifications hinges on the notion of freedom. Nietzsche takes a strong stance when references the master and slave moralities, in which you can see how he would most likely reference the master morality as being distinctly better than a slave morality. These moralities function along with the will to power, and the ubermensch. So for Nietzsche, the ubermensch is something to strive for, and the master morality is certainly something that is more admirable than a slave morality. However, I do not think that this is even close to what Dostoevsky is referencing with the use of a weak and a strong class. To me, the weak and strong classes are used to illustrate that there are always going to be those individuals that have an underlying necessity to fallow those that can provide for them. Those that can provide the earthly pleasure and dull the suffering are the strong, while the weak are those that fallow.

Reflection for October 7 - Nietzsche

            The writings from Nietzsche this week were by no means light. They have provoked some of the most serious thoughts about consciousness and individuality that I have encountered in my life. One of these first considerations was drawn from Nietzsche’s parable of the “madman.” In this, the madman asserts that God is dead, that indeed, we are the murderers of God. Needing of addressing, however, is who this God is. Are we speaking of the actual God in all of his omnipotence? I would believe that this is certainly not the case. Yet, who is this God, and how are we, the individuals of society, responsible for killing him (or it)?

            To proceed from what I believe to be the most logical starting point, I want to first address when we might have killed God. Here I believe that God is symbolic for traditional values. That is, God represents those values that have been embedded within society and encrypted as the norms that we see to be present. So, when might we have killed him? I would agree with one classmate who brought up the idea that this might have been during the enlightenment. That is, the enlightenment can be seen as a historical turning point in which society begins to shift away from superstitious ideas and embraces scientific rhetoric. We reject the use of skepticism and highlight our ability to use empiricism and epistemological outlooks.

            But now we must interpret what the madman means when he states that he is too early. He states that “this tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men” (Nietzsche in Solomon, 67). By this, it is emphasized that the ubermensch is not prevalent, at least not at a collective level. This idea of the ubermensch is highlighted within the philosophers, those individuals who feel a sense of relief when they believe that “all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again” (Nietzsche in Solomon, 68). This was an issue that was highlighted in class discussion and provoked a lot of differing perspectives. To many, the death of the “old God” should be seen as a good thing in the sense that the old God can be representative of outdated values that should be cast aside in order to make more room for a “new God,” One that is more representative of how current society functions.

            Yet, if Nietzsche can be said to represent the philosophers in this parable (as well as the underlying idea of the ubermensch), why would he be so excited to witness the death of the old God if it simply meant reconstructing a new one. After all, morality is taught to be a functioning concept within the structure of the herd mentality. These new values (simply dressed up morals) designed within the new God are once more a product of the herd, which is precisely the antithesis of what Nietzsche is trying to express when advocating for the ultimate goal of the ubermensch. For this precise reason, I don’t believe that Nietzsche is advocating for the creation of a new God in totality. Rather, I think that he acknowledges, at least to some extent, that achieving the ubermensch on a collective level is something that we may never reach. In other words, the madman will always be too early.

            Furthermore, consciousness and language are two conceptions that Nietzsche emphasizes within his writings. The question as to whether or not happiness is an invention of human creation was most definitely able to produce some class discussion. I believe that this is a difficult question to address since empiricism is something difficult to demonstrate in this instance. However, pressed to answer I would lean more towards the idea that no, happiness is purely relation to emotions. While the class discussion had established that language is a given for consciousness (consciousness if and only if language), it does not entail that a state of being (an emotion) does not exist without it. There is a fact of the matter as to the state of my being. That is, I currently feel something at a particular moment whether or not I can describe it.

            This is not to say that what makes me happy is not a product of human creation. This would be a much more difficult theme to argue. I simply believe that it does not matter what form happiness takes, there is a fact of the matter and it exists outside of its various forms regardless of whether or not we can communicate the feeling. 

Reflection for September 30 - Kierkegaard

Class discussion for this week was dominated by Kierkegaard’s ideas involving faith, subjectivity, and the three spheres of life, among other various themes that he has held to be important. As is extremely apparent from the class discussion itself, these concepts are very difficult to grasp, and Kierkegaard even essentially states that he writes for the few that can understand him. That being said, I believe the works by Kierkegaard that are under examination for this week’s reading are very difficult to comprehend, but allow for a very deep and philosophical discussion.

            I wanted to begin with a question posed by Kierkegaard himself, which was used by group 7 in their presentation. Kierkegaard poses the question that “if one who lives in the midst of Christianity goes up to the House of God, to the House of the true God, with knowledge of the true conception of God, and now prays, but prays in untruth; and when one lives in a godless country, but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is the most truth?” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 19). This question may appear to be difficult to discern, however, under further examination it becomes clear where the most truth lies for Kierkegaard.

            This can be explained to be so by Kierkegaard himself when saying that “only in subjectivity is there decision, whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the infinite is the deciding factor, not its content, for its content in just itself” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). Thus, we can see that Kierkegaard would most certainly identify the latter individual in the thought experiment posed earlier as having the most truth. But why is this? This was a critical question for many in the class. Why doesn’t the individual who holds the actual fact of the matter (knowledge of the true conception of God) have the most truth? As Thad was quick to point out to the student who brought this point up, you have to omit the latter part of the first description to maintain that standpoint. The truth held by the first individual is undermined by his praying in untruth. That is, regardless of the fact that he holds true conceptions of God, his praying in untruth outweighs the infinite passion of the latter.

            Once again, I believe that it would be fair to say that content is not necessarily important for truth according to Kierkegaard. He believes subjectivity is related to finding a decision whereas objectivity is blinding. “If I can grasp God objectively, I do not have faith, but just because I cannot do that, therefore I must have faith” (Kierkegaard in Solomon, 21). So truth is not related to objectivity, but rather the infinite passion expressed through subjectivity. What Kierkegaard is saying here is that without risk, there is no faith because if you could objectively grasp something, there would be no risk. Since the conceptualization of God by man is absurd, one cannot objectively grasp God. Therefore to identify oneself within a religious sphere of life, one must take a leap of faith of sorts. They must acknowledge the fact that Christianity is fundamentally paradoxical, and live through infinite passion. Yet, as was stated earlier, even if the faith was in fact false it would not entail untruth because truth lies in the subjective passion.

            This leads into the analysis provided by Robert Solomon concerning Kierkegaard’s three phases of life. From here I wanted to make a point that I was not able to make in class since I figured there was a very good possibility that I was wrong and shouldn't run the risk of embarrassing myself. The idea was constantly brought up that Kierkegaard almost presents these three spheres of life in a way in which the individual should progress through them in a systematic way. However I do not necessarily agree with this idea. Kierkegaard may assert that the shortcomings of one sphere of life may lead an individual to change their perceptions and, therefore, to move to a different sphere, but he never says that this is required. In fact, he seems to press the idea that no one has any good reason to choose one sphere of existence over another.

            Solomon further explains this idea by stating that “Kierkegaard, unlike Hegel, never argues that the movement from state to stage is necessary or that is can be demonstrated systematically” (Solomon, 1972, 93). Yet, class discussion kept pushing the idea that the aesthetic sphere would be encompassed by the ethical sphere, which would subsequently be encompassed by the religious sphere. I don’t believe this is what Kierkegaard is saying at all. While many people tried to come up with examples of what someone in both spheres would look like (a person’s desire to become a doctor for ulterior motives beyond helping people, while still holding the ethical standpoint of being able to help people was one of them), I think the main idea that is overlooked is the state of mind under consideration.

            This state of mind or the motives for doing something is what is necessary to identify if you wish to understand which sphere of life a certain individual should fit in. In the thought experiment of the self-interested doctor, I would say they are most certainly within the aesthetic sphere of life. This is because I believe, as I also think Kierkegaard believes, one cannot be within two spheres at the same time, just as no person can be in two different places at the same particular instance. The self-interested doctor is within the aesthetic sphere of life solely because he/she does not consider the collective interests of the community. Even if they did consider these communitarian interests, the self-interested motivations to become a doctor heavily outweigh the byproduct of being able to help people, and thus, would exclude them from the possibility of being within the ethical sphere of life.